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NOTES
MINNESOTA DEFAMATION LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION:
FIRST AMENDMENT LIMITATIONS ON THE COMMON LAW
TORTS OF LIBEL AND SLANDER
Defamation law has undergone significant change since 1964, when the
United States Supreme Court first held that the first amendment protects some defamatory statements. In subsequent decisions spanning
more than a decade, the Court has clarified the first amendment limitations. But unresolved issues still confront state courts as they apply
the first amendment limitations to a defamation action. This Note
discusses the issues confronting Minnesota courts by setting forth a
method for ascertainingthe relevant first amendment limitations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The common law, with some statutory modification,' governed defamation actions until 1964. Defamation law-the law of libel and slander 2-was usually a matter of strict liability. Liability was imposed for
publication of a false and defamatory statement without regard to the
intentions or even the negligence of the defendant,3 unless the communication enjoyed a common law privilege.4 The first amendment guarantees of free speech and press afforded no protection because it had long
been established that the first amendment protected only truthful state5
ments.

In the 1964 case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,' however, the
United States Supreme Court decided that the first amendment protects some defamatory falsehood, thus adding a constitutional dimen1. One statutory modification has given added protection to the media. Many states
have retraction statutes which allow a newspaper to mitigate damages by publishing a
retraction of the statement. See, e.g., CAL. CiV. CODE § 48a (West 1954); Ky. REV. STAT. §
411.051 (1972); MINN. STAT. § 548.06 (1976). Other states preclude defamation liability of
a radio or television broadcaster unless the broadcaster has been negligent in failing to
prevent the defamation. See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 659.5 (West 1950) (radio broadcaster); MINN. STAT. § 544.043 (1976) (radio and television broadcasters). See generally
Remmers, Recent Legislative Trends in Defamation by Radio, 64 HARv. L. REV. 727
(1951).
Another modification has limited liability for republication of a defamation. A number
of states have enacted the UNIFORM SINGLE PUBLICATION ACT. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE §§ 6702 to -705 (Supp. 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-27-30 to -34 (1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, §§ 2090.1-.5 (1967).
2. The general distinction between libel and slander is that slander is an oral defamation and libel is a written defamation. Richmond v. Post, 69 Minn. 457, 459, 72 N.W. 704,
704 (1897). Compare, e.g., McBride v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Minn. -,
, 235
N.W.2d 371, 372-73 (1975) (slander) with, e.g., Gadach v. Benton County Co-op Ass'n,
236 Minn. 507, 509-10, 53 N.W.2d 230, 232 (1952) (libel).
3. See Note, Publication of Inadvertent Defamatory Material, 25 MINN. L. REV. 495
(1941); notes 13-31 infra and accompanying text.
4. See notes 55-69 infra and accompanying text.
5. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 254-58 (1952); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (dictum). See also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
483-85 (1957) (first amendment does not protect obscenity).
6. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See notes 72-80 infra and accompanying text.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol3/iss1/3

2

et al.: Minnesota Defamation Law and the Constitution: First Amendment Li
19771

MINNESOTA DEFAMATION LAW

sion to defamation law. The Court in New York Times held that a public
official cannot recover for defamation unless the defendant acted with
actual malice-that is, with knowledge of falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth. Three years later, in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,7
the Court applied the New York Times actual malice requirement to
defamation actions brought by "public figures." But in the 1974 case of
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,' the Court held that the actual malice
standard is not constitutionally required in defamation actions brought
by private individuals. These and other decisions of the Court have
helped define the constitutional dimension, but its precise limits remain
unclear.
This Note will set forth a method for ascertaining how the first
amendment limits Minnesota defamation actions.' A brief explanation
of the common law of defamation'" and the emerging constitutional
limitations" will precede this discussion.
II.

THE COMMON LAW OF DEFAMATION

Defamation is a common law cause of action which recognizes an
individual's interest in protecting his reputation. The common law imposes liability for the unprivileged publication of a false and defamatory
statement which injures the reputation of another." Hence, a prima
facie case is established by showing publication; a defamatory statement referring to the plaintiff; and, in certain circumstances, special
damages. To avoid liability, the defendant must then prove the publication was true or privileged.
A.

Elements of a Prima Facie Case

Publication, in the context of a defamation action, means an oral or
written communication which is understood by a third party. 3 A picture," a letter, 15 a statement in a foreign language," a newspaper arti7. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). See notes 81-84 infra and accompanying text.
8. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). See notes 89-98 infra and accompanying text.
9. See notes 102-277 infra and accompanying text.
10. See notes 12-69 infra and accompanying text.
11. See notes 70-101 infra and accompanying text.
12. E.g., Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 222-23, 67 N.W.2d 413, 416 (1954);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs §§ 558-559 (1977).
13. Larson v. Krostue, 110 Minn. 337, 125 N.W. 262 (1910); Glatz v. Thein, 47 Minn.
278, 50 N.W. 127 (1891); Petsch v. Dispatch Printing Co., 40 Minn. 291, 293-94, 41 N.W.
1034, 1035 (1889).
14. Burton v. Crowell Pub. Co., 82 F.2d 154, 154-56 (2d Cir. 1936); Louka v. Park
Entertainments, Inc., 294 Mass. 268, 270-71, 1 N.E.2d 41, 42-43 (1936); Zbyszko v. New
York Am., Inc., 228 App. Div. 277, 277-78, 239 N.Y.S. 411, 413 (1930).
15. See Brill v. Minnesota Mines, Inc., 200 Minn. 454, 274 N.W. 631 (1937); McLaughlin v. Quinn, 183 Minn. 568, 237 N.W. 598 (1931); Hansen v. Hansen, 126 Minn. 426, 148
N.W. 457 (1914).
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cle,' 7 and a radio or television broadcast'8 all can be means of publication. In Minnesota,' 9 as in most states," the defendant must negligently
or intentionally communicate the statement to a third party. A defendant is not liable, for example, if a third party reads a defamatory letter
sent to the plaintiff unless the defendant had reason to know the third
party might read the letter.' In fact, publication was the only element
at common law which was not a matter of strict liability."2
. A statement is defamatory if it subjects the plaintiff to public hatred,
contempt, or ridicule. 3 The meaning of the publication, not solely a
literal reading, may establish the defamatory content. The defamatory
meaning may be apparent on the face of the statement or it may require
reference to extrinsic facts.25 This distinction results in different requirements of pleading and proof. If the defamatory meaning is apparent on
the face of the statement, only the words themselves must be pleaded
and proved to establish the defamation. 6 However, if extrinsic facts are
needed to establish the defamatory meaning, they too must be pleaded
and proved. 7
16. MacInnis v. National Herald Printing Co., 140 Minn. 171, 172-74, 167 N.W. 550,
550-51 (1918); Glatz v. Thein, 47 Minn. 278, 280, 50 N.W. 127, 128 (1891).
17. See, e.g., Lydiard v. Daily News Co., 110 Minn. 140, 124 N.W. 985 (1910); Landon
v. Watkins, 61 Minn. 137, 63 N.W. 615 (1895).
18. See, e.g., Wanamaker v. Lewis, 173 F. Supp. 126 (D.D.C. 1959); American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc. v. Simpson, 106 Ga. App. 230, 233, 126 S.E.2d 873,
876 (1962); Landau v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 205 Misc. 357, 359-60, 128
N.Y.S.2d 254, 257 (Sup. Ct. 1954), aff'd mer., 1 App. Div. 2d 660, 147 N.Y.S.2d 687
(1955).
19. Olson v. Molland, 181 Minn. 364, 232 N.W. 625 (1930); Kramer v. Perkins, 102
Minn. 455, 456-59, 113 N.W. 1062, 1063-64 (1907).
20. See W. PRosSEa, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 113, at 774-75 & nn.40-57 (4th
ed. 1971).
21. See cases cited note 19 supra.
22. See W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs § 113, at 772-76 (4th ed. 1971);
Note, supra note 3, at 495.
23. E.g., Morey v. Barnes, 212 Minn. 153, 156, 2 N.W.2d 829, 831 (1942); Cole v.
Millspaugh, 111 Minn. 159, 126 N.W. 626 (1910).
24. In Tawney v. Simonson, Whitcomb & Hurley Co., 109 Minn. 341, 352, 124 N.W.
229, 233 (1909), the court said that "[tihe question is not whether [the] article can be
divided into two parts, and each of those parts so analyzed separately from each other
that each would appear to be free from defamatory meaning. The article must be construed as a whole." However, when determining the meaning, the court will not enlarge
the sense of the words or give them an unnatural meaning. Jones v. Monico, 276 Minn.
371, 374, 150 N.W.2d 213, 215 (1967); Cleary v. Webster, 170 Minn. 420, 423, 212 N.W.
898, 899 (1927).
25. E.g., Kervin v. News Tribune Co., 178 Minn. 61, 225 N.W. 906 (1929); Ten Broeck
v. Journal Printing Co., 166 Minn. 173, 207 N.W. 497 (1926).
26. E.g., Sharpe v. Larson, 70 Minn. 209, 211-12, 72 N.W. 961, 962 (1897), rev'd second
appeal on other grounds, 74 Minn. 323, 77 N.W. 233 (1898); Fredrickson v. Johnson, 60
Minn. 337, 341, 62 N.W. 388, 389 (1895) (semble).
27. Ten Broeck v. Journal Printing Co., 166 Minn. 173, 175-76, 207 N.W. 497, 497-98

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol3/iss1/3

4

19771

et al.: Minnesota Defamation
Law and the Constitution: First Amendment Li
MINNESOTA DEFAMATION LAW

In addition to being defamatory, the communication must refer to the
plaintiff." The "colloquim" is the portion of the pleading which alleges
that the defamatory statement refers to the plaintiff." The defendant's
intention or negligence in referring to the plaintiff is immaterial under
the common law of most states.3 0 In Minnesota, however, the defendant
3
must intend to refer to the plaintiff. '
The common law of defamation recognizes three types of damages:
special, general, and punitive. Special damages can be recovered by
proving actual and special pecuniary loss. 32 A typical example is loss of
employment caused by the defamation.13 General damages are presumed, and are recoverable without proof of actual injury to reputation.3 1 Included in general damages are harm to reputation, mental distress, humiliation, and embarrassment.15 Punitive damages are de36
signed to punish the defendant, not to compensate the plaintiff.
Special damages can be recovered whenever proved, regardless of
whether the action is predicated on slander or libel. 37 The plaintiffs
ability to recover general damages, however, differs depending on
whether the action is based on slander or libel.
If the action is based on slander, general damages are presumed if the
(1926); Richmond v. Post, 69 Minn. 457, 72 N.W. 704 (1897); Newell v. How, 31 Minn.
235, 236-37, 17 N.W. 383, 383-84 (1883); Smith v. Coe, 22 Minn. 276 (1875).
28. Cady v. Minneapolis Times Co., 58 Minn. 329, 59 N.W. 1040 (1894); Stoll v. Houde,
34 Minn. 193, 25 N.W. 63 (1885).

29. E.g., Lewis, The Individual Member's Right to Recover Fora Defamation Leveled
at the Group, 17 U. MIAMI L. REv. 519, 519-20 (1963) ("The question of the plaintiff's
identity would theoretically be categorized under the colloquim; however, the trend toward greater liberalization in pleading and practice has more or less eliminated the use
of the formal pleadings.").
30. E.g., W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 113, at 771 (4th ed. 1971);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRs § 580B, comment b (1977).
31. Clare v. Farrell, 70 F. Supp. 276 (D. Minn. 1947) (applying Minnesota law); Knox
v. Meehan, 64 Minn. 280, 281-82, 66 N.W. 1149, 1149-50 (1896); Dressel v. Shipman, 57
Minn. 23, 58 N.W. 684 (1894).
32. E.g., Erick Bowman Remedy Co. v. Jensen Salsbery Labs., Inc., 17 F.2d 255, 259
(8th Cir. 1926). See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 112, at 76062 (4th ed. 1971). For a discussion of whether mental suffering should also be an element

of special damages see Day, Mental Suffering as an Element of Damages in Defamation
Cases, 15 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 26 (1966).
33. See Wilson v. Cotterman, 65 Md. 190, 3 A. 890 (1886); Lombard v. Lennox, 155
Mass. 70, 28 N.E. 1125 (1891).
34. E.g., Froslee v. Lund's State Bank, 131 Minn. 435, 438-39, 155 N.W. 619, 620-21
(1915); Svendsen v. State Bank, 64 Minn. 40, 65 N.W. 1086 (1896).
35. See, e.g., Thorson v. Albert Lea Pub. Co., 190 Minn. 200, 204-06, 251 N.W. 177,
179-80 (1933).
36. Loftsgaarden v. Reiling, 267 Minn. 181, 182 & n.2, 126 N.W.2d 154, 154-55 & n.2,
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 845 (1964); Hammersten v. Reiling, 262 Minn. 200, 205-06, 115
N.W.2d 259, 265-66, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962).
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 622, comment a (1977).
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slander falls into one of the per se categories: imputation of business
incompetency," imputation of a crime,"5 imputation of unchastity to a
woman, or imputation of a loathsome disease.' If the slander does not
fall into any of these categories, general damages are presumed only if
the plaintiff satisfies the threshold requirement of proving special damages.42
The early common law presumed general damages if the action was
based on libel." This rule has been modified in many states by retraction statutes, which create an exception for defamatory statements published by newspapers." Under the Minnesota retraction statute, only
special damages are recoverable from a newspaper if no retraction was
demanded or if the newspaper published the defamatory statement in
a good faith belief of its accuracy. 5 A second modification made by some
states, but apparently not Minnesota," distinguishes libel per se from
libel per quod 7 A libel per quod is not defamatory on its face." Damages
are presumed from a libel per quod only if the plaintiff first proves
38. E.g., Manion v. Jewel Tea Co., 135 Minn. 250, 252-53, 160 N.W. 767, 768 (1916);
Beek v. Nelson, 126 Minn. 10, 147 N.W. 668 (1914).
39. E.g., Yencho v. Kruly, 158 Minn. 408, 197 N.W. 752 (1924) (by implication); Burch
v. Bernard, 107 Minn. 210, 211, 120 N.W. 33, 34 (1909).
40. In Minnesota, the cases generally state that only imputation of business incompetency or of a crime constitute slander per se. See, e.g., Larson v. R.B. Wrigley Co., 183
Minn. 28, 29-30, 235 N.W. 393, 394 (1931); Beek v. Nelson, 126 Minn. 10, 147 N.W. 668
(1914). But in practice the imputation of unchastity to a woman was also recognized as
slander per se. See Schendel v. Mundt, 153 Minn. 209, 210, 190 N.W. 56, 56 (1922); Ernster
v. Eltgroth, 149 Minn. 39, 182 N.W. 709 (1921),
41. Apparently the Minnesota court has never had occasion to use the "loathsome
disease" category. There is no question, however, that imputation of a loathsome disease
is widely recognized as slander per se. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §
112, at 756-57 (4th ed. 1971).
42. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 575, comment a (1977). See, e.g., Gaare v.
Melbostad, 186 Minn. 96, 242 N.W. 466 (1932); Larson v. R.B. Wrigley Co., 183 Minn.
28, 235 N.W. 393 (1931).
43. See Larson v. R.B. Wrigley Co., 183 Minn. 28, 29, 235 N.W. 393, 394 (1931) (dictum); Pratt v. Pioneer-Press Co., 35 Minn. 251, 254-55, 28 N.W. 708, 709-10 (1886).
44. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 48a (West 1954); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 770.02 (West 1964 &
Supp. 1977); Ky. REv. STAT. § 441.051 (1972); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 600.2911 (West
1968).
45. MINN. STAT. § 548.06 (1976).
46. In cases where proof of extrinsic facts was necessary to prove the defamatory nature
of the statement, the Minnesota court has not expressed any limitation on the recovery
of damages. See, e.g., cases cited note 27 supra.
47. See Ilitzky v. Goodman, 57 Ariz. 216, 220-22, 112 P.2d 860, 862 (1941); Karrigan v.
Valentine, 184 Kan. 783, 339 P.2d 52 (1959); Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780,
785, 195 S.E. 55, 59 (1938); Ellsworth v. Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, Inc., 66 N.D.
578, 587-88, 268 N.W. 400, 405 (1936), aff'd second appeal, 68 N.D. 425, 280 N.W. 879
(1938), aff'd third appeal, 69 N.D. 610, 289 N.W. 101 (1939); Moore v. P.W. Pub. Co., 3
Ohio St. 2d 183, 187-90, 209 N.E.2d 412, 415 (1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966).
48. See cases cited note 47 supra.
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special damage, or if the libel falls into one of the slander per se catego-

ries."0
If the plaintiff seeks punitive damages, he must prove common law
malice,50 which consists of ill will or bad faith. 5' In Minnesota, punitive
damages are recoverable even in the absence of actual damages.52
B.

Defenses

The truth of the statement or a privilege to publish it provide the two
major defenses to an action for defamation. Under the common law, the
falsity of a defamatory publication was presumed .5 The burden of proving the truth of the statement, therefore, was on the defendant. 4 To
raise the defense of a common law privilege, a defendant must show that
he has an interest to be upheld, has acted in good faith, and has made
the statement on the proper occasion, for the proper purpose, and to the
proper parties.5 5 The common law recognizes two kinds of privilege-absolute and qualified.
Absolute privileges render the defamatory words not actionable even
though the words were intentionally false and malicious. 5 Statements
to which Minnesota common law extends an absolute privilege include
those made in the course of legislative and judicial proceedings. 7
49. Prosser, Libel Per Quod, 46 VA. L. REv. 839, 843-44 (1960). The RESTATEMENT (SEcOF TORTS § 569, comment c (1977) disapproves of the libel per quod rule. However,
this section was adopted after considerable debate. Two of the contributors to the
Restatement, William Prosser and Laurence Eldredge, had taken opposite positions on
libel per quod for years in law review articles. See Eldredge, Variation on Libel Per Quod,
25 VAND. L. REv. 79 (1972); Eldredge, The Spurious Rule of Libel Per Quod, 79 HARV. L.
REv. 733 (1966); Prosser, More Libel Per Quod, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1629 (1966); Prosser,
Libel Per Quad, 46 VA. L. REv. 839 (1960).
50. E.g., Hammersten v. Reiling, 262 Minn. 200, 209, 115 N.W.2d 259, 265-66, cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962); MacInnis v. National Herald Printing Co., 140 Minn. 171,
175, 167 N.W. 550, 551 (1918).
51. E.g., McBride v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Minn. -, 235 N.W.2d 371,
375 (1975); Otto v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., 262 Minn. 408, 414, 115 N.W.2d 36, 40 (1962);
Hebner v. Great Northern Ry., 78 Minn. 289, 292, 80 N.W. 1128, 1129 (1899).
52. Loftsgaarden v. Reiling, 267 Minn. 181, 126 N.W.2d 154, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 845
(1964), noted in 49 MINN. L. REv. 137 (1964) and 40 N.D.L. REv. 334 (1964).
53. E.g., Wilcox v. Moore, 69 Minn. 49, 52, 71 N.W. 917, 918-19 (1897); W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTs § 116, at 798 (4th ed. 1971).
54. See, e.g., Thompson v. Pioneer-Press Co., 37 Minn. 285, 294, 33 N.W. 856, 861-62
(1887); Palmer v. Smith, 21 Minn. 419, 420-21 (1875).
55. E.g., McBride v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., - Minn.
235 N.W.2d 371,
374 (1975); see Burch v. Bernard, 107 Minn. 210, 212, 120 N.W. 33, 34 (1909); Landon v.
Watkins, 61 Minn. 137, 144, 63 N.W. 615, 617-18 (1895).
56. E.g., Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 223, 67 N.W.2d 413, 416 (1954). See
generally Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: JudicialProceedings, 9 COLUM. L.
REv. 463 (1909).
57. E.g., Jenson v. Olson, 273 Minn. 390, 141 N.W.2d 488 (1966) (defamatory statement
made during a civil service hearing; hearing "quasi-judicial"); Rolfe v. Noyes Bros. &
OND)
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Qualified privileges, on the other hand, serve only to rebut the presumption of common law malice that is raised once the plaintiff has
proven a prima facie case. 5 These privileges, therefore, impose a burden
upon the plaintiff to prove common law malice.59 Common law malice,
as distinguished from New York Times actual malice, 0 can be proven
by showing the defendant's bad faith, ill will, or spite." Statements to
which the Minnesota common law extends a qualified privilege include
fair comment on the conduct of public officials,"2 fair and accurate reports of official proceedings, 3 statements made in the public interest, 4
and statements made about the character of employees.
The common law privileges developed because of a need to protect
Cutler, Inc., 157 Minn. 443, 196 N.W. 481 (1923) (defamatory statement appearing in
lawsuit complaint); Peterson v. Steenerson, 113 Minn. 87, 89, 129 N.W. 147, 147 (1910)
(dictum) (defamatory statement in legislative proceeding). But see Jones v. Monico, 276
Minn. 371, 374-76, 150 N.W.2d 213, 215-16 (1967) (per curiam) (defamatory statements
made during proceedings of local legislative bodies are afforded only a qualified privilege).
One limitation on the privilege is that the words must be pertinent to the matter in
issue. Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 224-29, 67 N.W.2d 413, 417-20 (1954); Dodge
v. Gilman, 122 Minn. 177, 178-79, 142 N.W. 147, 148 (1913).
For other instances of absolute privilege see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 585592A (1977).
58. E.g., McBride v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., - Minn.
235 N.W.2d 371,
374 (1975) (quoting Hebner v. Great Northern Ry., 78 Minn. 289, 292, 80 N.W. 1128, 1129
(1899)); Hansen v. Hansen, 126 Minn. 426, 427, 148 N.W. 457, 457 (1914).
59. Hammersten v. Reiling, 262 Minn. 200, 207, 115 N.W.2d 259, 264, cert. denied, 371
U.S. 862 (1962); Clancy v. Daily News Corp., 202 Minn. 1, 8-10, 277 N.W. 264, 268-69
(1938); Peterson v. Steenerson, 113 Minn. 87, 90, 129 N.W. 147, 148 (1910).
60. See notes 72-80 infra and accompanying text.
61. Common-law malice can be shown by evidence that the defendant knew the statement was false, Friedell v. Blakely Printing Co., 163 Minn. 226, 231, 203 N.W. 974, 976
(1925) (dictum); Froslee v. Lund's State Bank, 131 Minn. 435, 438, 155 N.W. 619, 620
(1915), that the defendant lacked a good faith belief of truth, Quinn v. Scott, 22 Minn.
456, 462 (1876), that the defendant acted in reckless disregard of the truth, Maclnnis v.
National Herald Printing Co., 140 Minn. 171, 175, 167 N.W. 550, 551 (1918), that the
defendant acted out of ill will or an improper motive, McKenzie v. Wm. J. Burns Int'l
Detective Agency, Inc., 149 Minn. 311, 312, 183 N.W. 516, 517 (1921); Hansen v. Hansen,
126 Minn. 426, 427-28, 148 N.W. 457, 457-58 (1914), or that the defendant republished the
defamation, Friedell v. Blakely Printing Co., 163 Minn. 226, 231, 203 N.W. 974,976 (1925)
(dictum); Gribble v. Pioneer Press Co., 34 Minn. 342, 25 N.W. 710 (1885).
62. E.g., Clancy v. Daily News Corp., 202 Minn. 1, 8, 277 N.W. 264, 268 (1938); Friedell
v. Blakely Printing Co., 163 Minn. 226, 230-31, 203 N.W. 974, 975-76 (1925); Fullerton v.
Thompson, 123 Minn. 136, 143-44, 143 N.W. 260, 262-63 (1913).
63. E.g., Hurley v. Northwest Pub., Inc., 273 F. Supp. 967, 970-72 (D. Minn. 1967),
aff'd, 398 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1968) (per curiam); Nixon v. Dispatch Printing Co., 101 Minn.
309, 112 N.W. 258 (1907).
64. E.g., Burch v. Bernard, 107 Minn. 210, 211-12, 120 N.W. 33, 34 (1909); see Mallory
v. Pioneer-Press Co., 34 Minn. 521, 522-23, 26 N.W. 904, 905 (1886).
65. See, e.g., McBride v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., - Minn. -,
-,
235 N.W.2d
371, 374 (1975); Otto v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., 262 Minn. 408, 115 N.W.2d 36 (1962).
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important interests through open discussion." The fair comment privilege, for example, developed to protect healthy criticism of public officials." But only a few states, including Minnesota, extended the privilege of fair comment to false statements of fact." In those states where
the privilege was limited to criticism based on true facts," a newspaper
criticized public officials at its own peril. Because this risk placed an
intolerable burden on first amendment freedoms, the United States
Supreme Court in 1964 intervened. For the first time, the law of defamation took on a constitutional dimension.
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION-EMERGING CONCEPTS

Before 1964, defamatory statements were held to be unworthy of constitutional protection. 0 First amendment interests, the United States
Supreme Court had said, were not advanced by falsehoods." Recognizing, however, that an absolute duty of publishing truth had a chilling
effect on first amendment freedoms, the Court in 1964 began a course
of decisions that brought defamatory falsehoods within the ambit of the
first amendment.
In the 1964 case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan," a police commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama, brought an action for defamation
against the New York Times newspaper, alleging he had been defamed
by a political advertisement that misstated his dealings with civil rights
demonstrators. In Alabama, the common law privilege of fair comment
applied only if criticism of a public official was true. Because some of
the statements in the advertisement were inaccurate, an Alabama jury
returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. 3 The United States Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the
right to criticize the government and government officials is central to
66. See Harper, Privileged Defamation, 22 VA. L. REV. 642, 642-49 (1936); Comment,
Defamation-A bsolute Immunity, 15 OHIo ST. L.J. 330, 331 (1954). See generally Veeder,
Freedom of Public Discussion, 23 HARV. L. REv. 413 (1910).
67. See, e.g., Hammersten v. Reiling, 262 Minn. 200, 207, 115 N.W.2d 259, 264, cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962); Herringer v. Ingberg, 91 Minn. 71, 76-77, 97 N.W. 460, 463
(1903); Wilcox v. Moore, 69 Minn. 49, 52, 71 N.W. 917, 918 (1897).
68. See Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 875,
896-97 & n.103 (1949) (nine states extend the privilege of fair comment to misstatements
of fact; 26 states do not extend the privilege of fair comment to misstatements of fact).
69. See Noel, supra note 68, at 896 n.102.
70. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 254-63 (1952) (state statute for criminal
libel does not violate freedom of speech and press applicable to the states by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment). See generally Note, Constitutionalityof the
Law of CriminalLibel, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 521 (1952).
71. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
72. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
73. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 144 So. 2d 25 (1962).
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the first amendment." The right to criticize, the Court said, includes the
right to make "vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials." 75 Moreover, it is realistic
to expect that open and vigorous debate on public issues will, at times,
result in error."8 To protect open and robust debate, therefore, the first
amendment must also protect some falsity."
The Court did not, however, grant absolute protection to falsity.
Rather, it held that a state cannot impose liability for the defamation
of a public official unless the public official proves the falsehood was
published with "actual malice."" Actual malice requires a showing by
clear and convincing evidence7 1 that the "defendant knew the statement
was false or acted in reckless disregard of the truth.""0 New York Times
thus represents the first major step in affording first amendment protection to the publication of defamatory statements.
New York Times involved a public official. The second important
1
when the
development occurred in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,"
Court applied the actual malice standard to defamation actions brought
by "public figure" plaintiffs. The Court reasoned that these plaintiffs,
either because of their status alone or because of their involvement in a
public controversy, 2 command such public interest that discussion of
their activity is analogous to the discussion and criticism of government
74. 376 U.S. at 273.
75. Id. at 270.
76. Id. at 271.
77. Id. at 271-72. The first amendment concern of providing latitude for the speaker is
frequently used as the rationale in decisions protecting speech. A speaker who must guess
at the bounds of proscribed speech will censor his own speech to avoid liability. Vague
statutes are often struck down on this basis. See, e.g., Hynes v. Mayor and Council of
Oradell, 96 S. Ct. 1755, 1760-62 (1976) (ordinance requiring notice of intent to solicit for
a "recognized charitable cause"); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 366-70 (1964) (statute
prohibiting state employment of "subversives").
78. 376 U.S. at 283.
79. Id. at 285-86.
80. Id. at 279-80.
81. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). The Court consolidated two lower court cases, Curtis Pub. Co.
v. Butts, 351 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1965) and Associated Press v. Walker, 393 S.W.2d 671
(Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1965), to consider the impact of New York Times on defamation cases
involving public figures.
82. One of the plaintiffs, Butts, was athletic director at the University of Georgia. The
defamation suit was based on an article published in The Saturday Evening Post which
accused him of conspiracy to fix a football game. The Court found that Butts may have
achieved the status of public figure by notoriety alone. 388 U.S. at 155. In contrast, the
other plaintiff, Walker, was a retired army general who had left the military to engage in
political activity. The defamation suit was based on an Associated Press news dispatch
which stated that Walker had led a violent crowd in opposition to federal marshals who
were enforcing a court order to enroll a black student at the University of Mississippi. The
Court found that Walker had achieved public figure status by thrusting himself into the
vortex of an important public controversy. Id.
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itself. 13 A majority of the Court, therefore, held that public figures must
also prove actual malice. 4
A divided Court extended the first amendment protection even further in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.," a 1971 decision. Rosenbloom
was a private individual arrested for selling allegedly obscene literature.
The defendant radio station reported that Rosenbloom had been arrested for selling obscene literature, failing to state that the literature
was only alleged to be obscene. After his acquittal on the obscenity
charge, Rosenbloom brought an action against the radio station for defamation. The court of appeals reversed a judgment for the plaintiff,
holding that a showing of actual malice was required because the report
involved a matter of public interest. 6 When the case came before the
United States Supreme Court, eight justices filed five opinions. The
plurality opinion, written by Justice Brennan, agreed with the court of
appeals. Reasoning that the presence of first amendment protections is
determined by examining the nature of the event, not the status of the
participant, 7 the plurality held that a private individual defamed in the
discussion of a public issue must prove actual malice to recover.
In the 1974 decision of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 9 the Court again
considered the question of first amendment protection in a defamation
action brought by a private individual. By then the composition of the
Court had changed, 0 and a majority decided that Rosenbloom had set
out an unworkable standard and unfair rule which encroached too far
on state libel law."' The interest in open debate was not served adequately by Rosenbloom because media defendants continued to be subject to strict liability if the defamation did not relate to a matter of
83. Id. at 163-65 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
84. The Court split on the degree of protection to be afforded in public figure cases.
Justice Harlan, who wrote the opinion for the Court, set out a negligence standard instead
of an actual malice standard. Id. at 155. He reasoned that public figure cases do not
present a situation analogous to public official cases and therefore ordinary tort rules
should govern. Id. at 152-55. But a majority of the Court agreed with Chief Justice Warren's use of an actual malice standard. Chief Justice Warren reasoned that the rationale
of New York Times was applicable because public figures, like public officials, have both
an influential role in society and access to the media. Id. at 164.
85. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
86. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 415 F.2d 892, 896 (3d Cir. 1969).
87. 403 U.S. at 43.
88. Id. at 52.
89. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
90. Justices Harlan and Black had left the bench between the two decisions. Justices
Powell and Rehnquist had joined the Court. Together with Justices Marshall and Stewart,
who had dissented in Rosenbloom, Justices Powell and Rehnquist agreed on the question
of first amendment protection. Justice Blackmun concurred, explaining that his shift in
position from Rosenbloom was designed to provide solidarity in an area where the Court
had been "sadly fractionated." Id. at 354.
91. Id. at 345-48.
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public interest." Nor was the interest in redressing injury to reputation
served adequately, because deserving private plaintiffs often could not
meet the burden of proving actual malice."3 The Court concluded, therefore, that the states may disregard the Rosenbloom requirements of
determining whether a public issue is involved and of proving actual
malice. Instead, the states may condition liability upon any standard
of fault in defamation actions brought by private individuals.1 4 Strict
liability, however, may not be imposed,95 and neither presumed nor
punitive damages are recoverable unless the private plaintiff proves
actual malice. 6 Furthermore, public officials and public figures must
still prove actual malice because they have access to the media to reply
and have assumed the risk of adverse comment.'
Gertz, then, marks a change in emphasis from the interest in protecting the discussion of public issues to the interest in vindicating private
reputation. To provide greater protection to private individuals, the
states should be allowed "substantial latitude in their efforts to enforce
a legal remedy for defamatory falsehoods injurious to the reputation of
a private individual."
The Court reinforced this shift in emphasis in Time, Inc. v.
Firestone,9 a 1976 case involving a misreport of the decree in the plaintiff's divorce litigation. The Court held that the plaintiff could not be
deemed a public figure because the Butts requirement of involvement
in a public controversy was not met. Divorce litigation, the Court said,
is a private, not a public, controversy.'" The Court also refused to extend special protection to false reports of judicial proceedings because
the creation of such a subject matter category would amount to a reinstatement of Rosenbloom.'90
From New York Times through Firestone, the Court's decisions on
first amendment limitations on defamation actions have had a profound
effect on state defamation law. Whenever the first amendment applies,
it precludes the imposition of strict liability for defamation. Some room
is left for the states to adopt their own standards of liability in private
individual actions, however. And although the Court's decisions since
New York Times have answered some questions about the application
of first amendment protection, other questions remain. Minnesota's re92. Id. at 346.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 347.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 348-50.
97. Id. at 345.
98. Id. at 345-46.
99. 96 S. Ct. 958 (1976).
100. Id. at 965-66.
101. Id. at 966-67.
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sponse to these alternatives and unanswered questions is the next subject of consideration.
IV.

FIRST AMENDMENT LIMITATIONS ON THE MINNESOTA COMMON LAW OF

DEFAMATION

Ascertaining the precise effects of the first amendment on a defamation action involves a three-step process. First, it must be decided
whether the first amendment protections even apply. In the case of a
defamation action against a media defendant, the protections clearly
are in force. In other cases, the decision hinges on the resolution of two
major issues: one, whether the first amendment protects non-media as
well as media defendants; 02 and two, whether it protects non-media
slanders. '
If the protections do apply, the next step is to determine which set of
requirements limit the action-those of New York Times, Butts, or
Gertz. 01 This question is resolved by making a simultaneous inquiry
into the status of the plaintiff and the content of the statement.
The final step is to apply the appropriate set of constitutional require05
ments.
A. Determining Whether the FirstAmendment Limitations
Apply-Protection of Non-Media Defendants and Slanders
The issue of whether the first amendment protections extend to nonmedia defendants arises because the Court has never been confronted
with a defamation action in which the statement was published by a
means other than the media. The holdings and rationale in the Court's
decisions, therefore, are phrased in terms of newspapers and broadcasters. 00 Several of the decisions, however, support a conclusion that the
first amendment protections apply to non-media defendants. In
Garrisonv. Louisiana'7 and Henry v. Collins,0 1the Court afforded first
amendment protection to non-media defendants who issued defamatory
press releases. In St. Amant v. Thompson,'0 1the Court gave first amend102. See notes 106-17 infra and accompanying text.
103. See notes 118-19 infra and accompanying text.
104. See notes 120-65 infra and accompanying text.
105. See notes 166-277 infra and accompanying text.
106. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 332 (1974) (Court stated first
amendment issue in context of protection afforded to "a newspaper or broadcaster");
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 (1971) (holding phrased in terms of a
"licensed radio station"); Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967) (public figure
must prove defendant's extreme departure from standards of "investigating and reporting").
107. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
108. 380 U.S. 356 (1965) (per curiam).
109. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
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ment protection to a political candidate who made a defamatory speech
over television.
Some state and federal courts have applied the same constitutional
protection both to the press and to non-media speakers. 10 This is the
approach favored by the Restatement."' In Minnesota, media defendants fare slightly better than non-media defendants because of the
Minnesota retraction"' and broadcaster"' statutes. The Minnesota decision of Beatty v. Ellings, 4 however, indicates that the Minnesota court
will apply the first amendment protection in defamation actions against
non-media as well as media defendants."' That case involved an action
brought by a public figure for slanders made by several non-media individuals during the course of three public meetings. Although the court
had ample common law grounds for deciding the case,"' it used a first
amendment basis." 7 More recently, the court applied the New York
Times actual malice standard in Hirman v. Rogers,"' a case involving
non-media defendants who had used the media to publish the allegedly
defamatory statements. The court held that the defendant's motion to
dismiss should have been granted because the evidence on the issue of
actual malice was insufficient as a matter of law." 7 ,2
110. See Davis v. Schuchat, 510 F.2d 731, 733-34 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Ammond v.
McGahn, 390 F. Supp. 655, 660-61 (D.N.J. 1975) (dictum), rev'd on other grounds, 532
F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1976); Williams v. Trust Co., Ga. App....,
,230 S.E.2d 45,
47-48 (1976); Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276Md. 580,590-94,350 A.2d 688, 694-96 (1976);
Cera v. Mulligan, 79 Misc. 2d 400, 358 N.Y.S.2d 642 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Cline v. Brown, 24
N.C. App. 209, 210 S.E.2d 446 (1974), cert. denied, 286 N.C. 412, 211 S.E.2d 793 (1975).
111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B, comment d (1977) takes the position that
it is anomalous to impose strict liability on an ordinary citizen for making a defamatory
statement to a neighbor while holding a newspaper publisher, who has published the same
words to a much larger audience, liable only upon a showing of fault. For the argument
that the Court should afford the press greater protection than other speakers see Nimmer,
Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does It Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26
HASTINGS L.J. 639 (1975).
112. MINN. STAT. § 548.06 (1976).
113. MINN. STAT. § 544.043 (1976) precludes liability against a television or radio station

for a defamatory broadcast, made by someone other than an agent or employee of the
station, which could not have been reasonably prevented.
114. 285 Minn. 293, 173 N.W.2d 12 (1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 904 (1970).
115. See also Lydiard v. Wingate, 131 Minn. 355, 155 N.W. 212 (1915) (implication that
the common law privilege of fair comment extends equally to citizens and newspapers);
Herringer v. Ingberg, 91 Minn. 71, 76-77, 97 N.W. 460, 463 (1903) (same).
116. The court could have disposed of the case solely on the grounds that the defendants' statement were not defamatory, 285 Minn. at 300, 173 N.W.2d at 16-17, or that
the words were not actionable in the absence of special damage, id. at 300-01, 173 N.W.2d
at 17. The court also considered a common law privilege attaching to public proceedings,
but found it unnecessary to use the privilege in its decision because of "the seemingly more
sweeping constitutional privilege." Id. at 302 n.13, 173 N.W.2d at 18 n.13.
117. Id. at 301-02, 173 N.W.2d at 17-18.
117.1. No. 46760 (Minn. Aug. 12,1977).
117.2. Id., Slip op. at 8.
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The Beatty decision also indicates that the Minnesota court will
apply the first amendment requirements to non-media slanders. Because the United States Supreme Court has never addressed the issue
of whether the first amendment protects non-media slanders, it is conceivable that a state could impose the first amendment requirements in
actions for libels and media slanders while not imposing such requirements for non-media slanders."18 Beatty, however, indicates that the
Minnesota court will impose the first amendment requirements in actions for non-media slanders, because the court held that the public
figure plaintiff could not recover for slanders spoken by several individuals unless there was proof of actual malice."'
B.

Determining Whether the Requirements of New York Times, Butts,
or Gertz Apply to the Defamation Action

The defamation decisions of the United States Supreme Court have
created two sets of first amendment requirements. One set, derived from
New York Times'2 ' and Butts,"' applies to public officials and public
figures, respectively. The second set of requirements, set forth in
Gertz, 21 applies to private individuals. To determine which set of requirements apply, the initial inquiry is into the public or private status
of the plaintiff. But the inquiry cannot end here, because some defamatory statements may have no relationship whatever to the public status
of a plaintiff. A simultaneous inquiry must be made, therefore, into the
content of the statement and its relationship to the status of the plaintiff.
1. Public Officials and Public Figures
At the very least, public officials include those individuals "in the
hierarchy of government employees who have or appear to have substantial responsibility for, or control over the conduct of governmental affairs. 1' 2 3 More useful than a definition of public official, however, is a
survey of the case law which has applied the actual malice standard to
cases involving specific officials. From the outset it was clear that the
public official category did not refer solely to high government officials:
the plaintiff in New York Times was a commissioner at the municipal
118. See Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 590-94, 350 A.2d 688, 694-96 (1976);
OF ToRTs § 580B,' comment d (1977).
119. 285 Minn. at 301-02, 173 N.W.2d at 17-18.
120. See notes 72-80 supra and accompanying text.
121. See notes 81-84 supra and accompanying text.
122. See notes 89-98 supra and accompanying text.
123. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966). See generally Comment, Defamation
of a Public Official: The New York Times Case in Perspective, 15 DE PAUL L. REv. 376,
388-96 (1966) (meaning of "public official").
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
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level.' 24 The Court has since required the actual malice standard in cases
involving elected municipal judges, 25 a county attorney, 26 candidates
for public office,' 27 chiefs of police, 2 a park supervisor,' 9 and a deputy
sheriff. '0
The Minnesota Supreme Court has treated the plaintiffs as public
officials in three cases. In Mahnke v. Northwest Publications,Inc., 31 the
court applied the actual malice standard in a defamation action brought
by a police detective. The defamatory statements about the detective
appeared in a newspaper account of a criminal complaint the detective
32
was investigating. The second case, Standke v. B.E. Darby & Sons,
involved newspaper criticism of a grand jury investigation. The court
held that the plaintiff grand juror was a public official, but it did so
reluctantly because a grand juror neither seeks his position nor has easy
access to the media for reply. 1 3 The court felt compelled, however, to
view the grand juror as a public official in light of the governmental
nature of grand jury proceedings.3 4 Finally, in Hirman v. Rogers, 34' the
parties had agreed that the plaintiffs, two police officers and a deputy
sheriff, were public officials. The court held, therefore, that in the absence of any evidence of New York Times actual malice, a motion to
3 .2
dismiss should have been granted by the trial court.
Even if the plaintiff is a public official, the actual malice standard
applies only if the statement relates to official conduct of any kind'3 or
to private conduct which touches the official's fitness for public office. 3 ,
If the statement does not have this relationship, presumably the Gertz
requirements apply. 3 7
124. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964).
125. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
126. Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965) (per curiam).

127. Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971); Monitor Patriot Co. v.
Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971).
128. Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971); Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965). See

also Jackson v. Filliben, 281 A.2d 604 (Del. Super. 1971) (police sergeant is a public
official); Coursey v. Greater Niles Township Pub. Corp., 40 Ill. 2d 257, 264-65, 239 N.E.2d
837, 841 (1968) (lowest ranking patrolman is a public official).
129. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
130. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
131. 280 Minn. 328, 160 N.W.2d 1 (1968).
132. 291 Minn. 468, 193 N.W.2d 139 (1971), cert. dismissed, 406 U.S. 902 (1972).
133. Id. at 471-72, 193 N.W.2d at 142-43.
134. Id. at 473-74, 193 N.W.2d at 143-44.
134.1. No. 46760 (Minn. Aug. 12, 1977).

134.2. Id., Slip op. at 7-8.
135. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966).
136. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 76-77 (1964).

137. In Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85-86 (1966), the Court said:
The motivating force for the decision in New York Times was twofold. ...
There is, first, a strong interestein debate on public issues, and, second, a strong
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In deciding who is a public figure, the Court in Gertz indicated that
persons become public figures in one of two ways. Either they "occupy
positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed
public figures for all purposes" or they "thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved.""'3 The former are general public figures
whereas the latter are public figures for limited purposes and for a
limited number of issues. This "limited" public figure category includes
both those individuals who are involuntarily "drawn into" as well as
those who voluntarily thrust themselves into the forefront of a particular
controversy." 9 To determine whether a person is a limited public figure,
the Court has said that the most useful approach is to examine "the
nature and extent of an individual's participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the defamation.""'
Prior to Gertz, the public figure category seemed to encompass a great
number of individuals.' But in Gertz and Firestonethe Court made it
clear that the category is in fact rather narrow. Although the plaintiff
interest in debate about those persons who are in a position significantly to
influence the resolution of those issues . .. Where a position in government has
such apparent importance that the public has an independent interest in the
qualifications and performance of the person who holds it, beyond the general
public interest in the qualifications and performance of all government employees, both elements we identified in New York Times are present and the New
York Times malice standards apply.
If a statement relates to a purely personal matter which has no bearing on the official's
fitness for office, neither of the two motivating factors for the New York Times decision
is present. The statement, therefore, relates to the official in his status as a private
citizen and Gertz rather than New York Times should be applied. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B, comment a (1977); Note, Extension of Sullivan's Actual Malice
Standard to Defamation of Public Figures, 2 GA. L. REv. 393, 414-16 (1968).
It is conceded, however, that as a practical matter most statements about a public
official will be protected by the actual malice standard because even personal attributes
such as "dishonesty, malfeasance, or improper motivation" bear a relationship to the
public official's fitness for office. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964). See Note,
Recent Developments Concerning ConstitutionalLimitations on State DefamationLaws,
18 VAND. L. Rlv. 1429, 1446 (1965).
138. 418 U.S. at 345 (1974).
139. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974). "Hypothetically, it may be
possible for someone to become a public figure through no purposeful action of his own,
but the instances of truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare." Id. at 345.
140. Id. at 352.
141. E.g., Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEX. L. REv. 199, 221-22 (1976). One reason why the public figure
category seemed so broad was the Court's failure to define it more precisely in Curtis Pub.
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). Comment, Libel of the Public Figure:An Unsettled
Controversy, 12 ST. Louis L.J. 103, 116-18 (1967); Comment, Libel and Public Figures:
Extension of the Rule of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 36 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 132, 14950 (1968).
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in Gertz was a prominent Chicago lawyer, the author of books and legal
articles, and an officer in civic and professional organizations,"' the
Court held that he was not a public figure. 3 Applying the test for
general public figures, the Court found no clear evidence of "general
fame or notoriety in the community" or "pervasive involvement in the
affairs of society."'' Applying the test for limited public figures, the
Court found that the plaintiff played either a minimal role or no role at
all in the controversies giving rise to the defamation.'
The plaintiff in Firestone was the wife of Russell Firestone, heir to the
tire fortune.' 6 She was also a prominent figure in Palm Beach society. " 7
The Court said that these factors were insufficient to make her a general
public figure.'48 The Court also said that the defamatory statement
about her divorce, described as a "cause celbre,"'' 4 did not involve a
"public controversy" within the meaning of Gertz, even though many
members of the public were curious about her divorce.' The plaintiff,
therefore, was not a limited public figure.
Four Minnesota cases have dealt with the issue of whether the plaintiff was a public figure. Rose v. Koch 5' involved a defamation action
brought by Arnold Rose, an ex-legislator, sociology professor, and author
of many scholarly works, including An American Dilemma. Using the
language of Butts, which defines public figures as persons who thrust
themselves into public controversies and have access to the media for
rebuttal, the court held that Rose was a public figure. 52 His position as
a professor and respected figure in the field of sociology, as well as his
demonstrated access to the press, were sufficient to satisfy the Butts
test.
The second and third cases involved the same plaintiff. In Beatty v.
Ellings'53 and Beatty v. Republican Herald Publishing Co.,' the plaintiff was an attorney who alleged that he had been defamed by various
public officials and a newspaper during his vigorous campaign of opposition to urban renewal and redevelopment programs in Winona, Minnesota. Quoting Butts, the court found that the plaintiff had become a
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

418 U.S. at 351.
Id. at 352.
Id.
Id.
96 S. Ct. at 963.
Id. at 963.
Id.
This description was used by the Florida Supreme Court. Id.
Id.
278 Minn. 235, 154 N.W.2d 409 (1967).

152. Id. at 256-61, 154 N.W.2d at 424-26.
153. 285 Minn. 293, 173 N.W.2d 12 (1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 904 (1970).
154. 291 Minn. 34, 189 N.W.2d 182 (1971).
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public figure through the "thrusting of his personality into the 'vortex'
of an important public controversy. ''155
Finally, in Standke v. B. E. Darby & Sons,'5 ' the court held that the
grand jurors are either public officials by virtue of their position, or
public figures by virtue of their activity. The court relied on Time, Inc.
v.Hill5 7 and Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 58 for the proposition that
a person may become an involuntary public figure when placed in a
position where the public interest demands free criticism.'
When the Court in Gertz determined that the plaintiff was not a
public figure, it clarified the definition of that term. Because all four
Minnesota cases on public figures were decided before Gertz, total reliance on these cases would be misguided. The Butts test of limited public
figures, used by the Minnesota court in its decisions, has been refined
by Gertz and Firestone. Mere notoriety or involvement in public issues
is insufficient to make the plaintiff a limited public figure. Rather, there
must be a close nexus between the content of the defamation and such
involvement.' 0 Moreover, the Minnesota court in Standke used the
Rosenbloom test, which required proof of actual malice if the private
individual had been defamed in the discussion of a public issue, but not
if he had been defamed in the discussion of a purely personal matter.'"
Gertz effectively overruled Rosenbloom, and this distinction is no longer
required. " 2
2. Private Individuals
Determining whether the plaintiff is a private individual is essentially
a process of elimination: if the plaintiff is not a public official or a public
figure, he is a private individual for the purpose of applying the constitutional limitations set forth in Gertz. 163
The application of Gertz is not solely a function of the plaintiff's
private status, however. The Court in Gertz said that at the very least
155. Beatty v. Ellings, 285 Minn. 293, 301 n.12, 173 N.W.2d 12, 17 n.12 (1969), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 904 (1970).
156. 291 Minn. 468, 193 N.W.2d 139 (1971), cert. dismissed, 406 U.S. 902 (1972).
157. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
158. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
159. 291 Minn. at 474-75, 193 N.W.2d at 144.
160. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S.323, 351-52 (1974); Comment, Libel and
Slander-A State Is Precluded from Imposing Liability Without Fault or Presumed or
Punitive Damages in the Absence of New York Times Malice-Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 6 Loy. U.L.J. 256, 275-76 (1975). See generally Robertson, supra note 141, at 220-30.
161. See 291 Minn. at 475-77, 193 N.W.2d at 144-45.
162. See notes 85-98 supra and accompanying text.
163. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351-52 (1974); RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF ToRTs § 580B, comment a (1977); Comment, supra note 160, at 275-76 (by implication).
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its decision applies when the defamatory statement makes "substantial
'
danger to reputation apparent."164
The opinion leaves unclear, then, the
extent to which Gertz applies when the content of the statement does
not warn of its potential for harm to reputation. Because this issue
relates more to the scope of Gertz than to the threshold question of
whether Gertz applies, it is discussed elsewhere in this Note.6 5
C.

Applying the Requirements of New York Times, Butts, and Gertz

The next step in assessing the impact of New York Times, Butts, and
Gertz on a defamation action is to apply the appropriate first amendment requirements. One set of requirements relates to public officials
and public figures, "6 the other relates to private individuals. 7 Both
sets, however, have an impact on common law defenses.'
1.

Public Officials and Public Figures-Applyingthe New York Times
and Butts Requirement of Proving Actual Malice

When the United States Supreme Court decided New York Times, it
cited cases from several states which had already extended the common
law privilege of fair comment to false statements. '" Among the cases
cited was Friedell v. Blakely Printing Co.,"76 a 1925 Minnesota case.
Friedell set out the rule that a public official could not recover for
defamation unless he proved that the defendant had known the statement was false or otherwise had acted with common law malice. " Because of FriedeU1, the decision in New York Times did not radically alter
Minnesota defamation law. The chief difference is that a defamed public official must now show actual malice to recover,' rather than common law malice consisting of ill will or spite.
Butts, on the other hand, did introduce a new concept into Minnesota
defamation law by requiring that a public figure prove actual malice to
recover.' Because Minnesota recognizes no common law privilege to
defame a public figure,"' the impact of Butts on Minnesota defamation
164. 418 U.S. at 348 (quoting Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967)).

165. See notes 234-48 infra and accompanying text.
166. See notes 169-77 infra and accompanying text.
167. See notes 178-267 infra and accompanying text.
168. See notes 268-77 infra and accompanying text.
169. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 n.20 (1964).
170. 163 Minn. 226, 203 N.W. 974 (1925).
171. Id. at 230, 203 N.W. at 975.
172. See notes 72-80 supra and accompanying text.
173. See notes 81-84 supra and accompanying text.
174. The common law privilege of fair comment encompasses defamatory statements
concerning matters of public interest as well as public officials, and therefore there could
be a common law privilege to defame a public figure involved in a matter of public
interest. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToiRrs § 606(2) (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974); Boyer,
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law is substantially greater than New York Times.
The actual malice standard set out in New York Times and Butts
requires public officials and public figures to show with convincing clarity'75 that the defendant knew the statement was false or acted in reckless disregard of the truth.'76 The test for reckless disregard is not objective. Rather, it requires a showing that the defendant had actual and
subjective doubts as to the truth of the statement. 77
2.

PrivateIndividuals-Applying the Gertz Requirements

The Court in Gertz held that a state may impose liability for the
defamation of a private individual upon a showing of some fault.17 The
Court also stated, however, that neither presumed nor punitive damages
can be recovered unless the private individual proves that the defendant's fault consists of actual malice. 7 Thus, there are two broad issues
to be considered when applying Gertz in Minnesota. The first involves
the standard of fault that will be required by the Minnesota court.10 The
second involves a private individual's ability to recover presumed and
punitive damages.'8
a.

The Standard of Fault

Because Gertz allows the states to impose liability for defamation of
a private individual upon a showing of the defendant's fault in failing
to ascertain the falsity of his statement, the application of Gertz in
Minnesota will necessarily involve a selection of this fault standard. 82
In addition, however, consideration must also be given to the problems
1
which arise in the application of the fault standard chosen. 3
i.

Selection of the Fault Standard

The United States Supreme Court, in Firestone,' reiterated its
stance in Gertz and said it will not take the Rosenbloom approach,
which required states to look beyond the status of a plaintiff to see
Fair Comment, 15 OHIo ST. L.J. 280, 283-85 (1954). However, there appear to be no cases
in Minnesota which have extended the fair comment privilege to defamation of public
figures.
175. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964).
176. Id. at 279-80.
177. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
178. 418 U.S. at 347.
179. Id. at 348-51.
180. See notes 182-248 infra and accompanying text.
181. See notes 249-67 infra and accompanying text.
182. See notes 184-233 infra and accompanying text.
183. See notes 234-48 infra and accompanying text.
184. 96 S. Ct. 958 (1976).
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whether an issue of public or general interest was involved in the defamation. If such an issue was involved, the private individual had to show
18
that the defendant had acted with New York Times actual malice. '
Because of the latitude permitted by Gertz, however, a state may take
the Rosenbloom approach. But in addition to providing greater protection for public-issue statements, a state must also comply with the Gertz
requirements of some fault in all other defamations."'s Four
states-Indiana, Colorado, New York, and Arizona-essentially have
taken the Rosenbloom approach.'87 A threshold question for the Minnesota court, therefore, is whether it too should take the issue-oriented
approach similar to that set forth in Rosenbloom.
Of the four states, only Indiana based its decision on its own constitution. An Indiana appellate court took the position that a "free interchange of thought and opinion" provision of the state's constitution'88
protects matters of public interest."8 To effect that protection, the court
adopted Rosenbloom outright.19 °
Relying in part on the Indiana case, the Supreme Court of Colorado
also required that the standard of liability turn on the nature of the issue
involved in the defamation.' 1 The Colorado decision was based on the
court's own view of first amendment guarantees.' 2 To avoid the chill
and self-censorship that would follow from a negligence standard, the
court decided, statements of public interest must be given the special
3
protection of an actual malice standard.
The New York Court of Appeals did not state its reasons for taking
an issue-oriented approach."' Apparently New York has a history of
providing greater protection when a defamation involves public-issue
statements. "I
185. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 (1971).

186. See generally Robertson, supra note 141, at 235-45.
187. See Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 26 Ariz. App. 274, 280-81, 547 P.2d 1074,
1081 (1976); Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo.86, 98-100, 538 P.2d 450, 45758 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975); AAFCO Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v.
Northwest Pubs., Inc., Ind. App.
_ -,
321 N.E.2d 580, 585-86 (1974), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196,
341 N.E.2d 569, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975). See notes 188-98 infra and accompanying text.
188. IND. CONST. art. 1, § 9.

189. AAFCO Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Pubs., Inc.,
-

-

190.
191.
(1975),
192.
193.

- Ind. App.

321 N.E.2d 580, 586 (1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976).

Id.
Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 98-100, 538 P.2d 450, 457-58
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975).
Id. at 99-100, 538 P.2d at 457-58.
Id. at 99, 538 P.2d at 457-58.

194. Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d 569, 379
N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975).

195. See, e.g., Garfinkel v. Twenty-First Century Pub. Co., 30 App. Div. 2d 787, 788,
291 N.Y.S.2d 735, 737 (1968) (per curiam); Commercial Programming Unlimited v. CBS
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Arizona, prior to Gertz, extended a common law privilege to all newspaper publications of public interest.' After Gertz, the Arizona court
concluded that the privilege protects the discussion of public issues.'
The court decided, therefore, that New York Times actual malice or
common law malice must be shown when statements of public issues are
involved in the defamation."'
It seems doubtful that the Minnesota Supreme Court could justify an
issue-oriented approach on any of the bases set out by these four courts.
The Minnesota court has said that the free speech and press clause of
the Minnesota constitution does not afford more protection than the
first amendment.'" Reasoning similar to the Indiana court's should
thereby be precluded. Public policy and precedent might provide a rationale, because several Minnesota cases decided before New York
Times speak broadly of protecting the discussion of public issues.2 "° A
closer examination of those cases, however, reveals that it is only when
the statement is connected with the discussion of public officials or
candidates for office that the Minnesota court has focused on the content of the statement. Although it may be argued on the basis of such
cases. that Minnesota public policy protects the discussion of public
issues, the court may well look upon those decisions as absorbed by New
York Times.
The Minnesota case of Standke v. B.E. Darby & Sons' also might
support the adoption of an issue-oriented approach. Standke, decided
six months after Rosenbloom,20 1 raised the question of whether grand
jurors are "public officials" within the meaning of New York Times. The
Inc., 81 Misc. 2d 678, 686-88, 367 N.Y.S.2d 986, 994-96 (Sup. Ct. 1975), rev'd on other
grounds, 50 App. Div. 2d 351, 378 N.Y.S.2d 69 (1975); Lloyds v. UPI, Inc., 63 Misc. 2d
421, 423-24, 311 N.Y.S.2d 373, 376 (Sup. Ct. 1970); Cohen v. New York Herald Tribune,
Inc., 63 Misc. 2d 87, 91-92, 310 N.Y.S.2d 709, 714-15 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
196. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Choisser, 82 Ariz. 271, 276-77, 312 P.2d 150, 154
(1957); Broking v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 76 Ariz. 334, 346, 264 P.2d 413, 417 (1953).
197. Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 26 Ariz. App. 274, 279-81, 547 P.2d 1074,
1079-81 (1976).
198. Id. at 281, 547 P.2d at 1081.
199. See Dayton Co. v. Carpet, Linoleum & Resilient Floor Decorators Local 596, 229
Minn. 87, 99-112, 39 N.W.2d 183, 190-97 (1949), appeal dismissed, 339 U.S. 906 (1950);
cf., e.g., Anderson v. City of St. Paul, 226 Minn. 186, 190, 32 N.W.2d 538, 541 (1948) (state
due process clause not intended to be more restrictive than federal due process clause);
State v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 213 Minn. 395, 398-99, 7 N.W.2d 691, 694 (1942) (same),
aff'd, 322 U.S. 292 (1944).
200. See, e.g., Friedell v. Blakely Printing Co., 163 Minn. 226, 229-30, 203 N.W. 974,
975 (1925); Herringer v. Ingberg, 91 Minn. 71, 76-77, 97 N.W. 460, 463 (1903); Marks v.
Baker, 28 Minn. 162, 165, 9 N.W. 678, 680 (1881).
201. 291 Minn. 468, 193 N.W.2d 139 (1971).
202. Compare Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 29 (1971) (decided June
7, 1971) with Standke v. B.E. Darby & Sons, 291 Minn. 468, 468, 193 N.W.2d 139, 139
(1971) (decided December 3, 1971).
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court took a broad view of the New York Times requirements and stated
that "in view of the public interest in the performance of functions
delegated by law to the grand jury, the interests of free and open discussion demand that grand jurors in this case must be considered public
officials or figures." 0 Even if grand jurors are deemed private individuals, the court said, Rosenbloom requires the application of the actual
malice standard because the activities of a grand jury are matters of
public or general concern. 04 The court viewed the Rosenbloom development as a logical outgrowth of New York Times that "has been emerging
for some time and to some degree has been intertwined in New York
Times." 0 5
There are indications, however, that the court in Standke gave special
protection to matters of public interest only because it felt compelled
to do so by Rosenbloom. The Minnesota court admitted that it was
reluctant to find that grand jurors are public officials, because they
neither seek their public status nor have easy access to the media.,
Implicit in this reluctance may be the court's conviction that private
individuals should not be compelled to prove the stringent New York
Times actual malice standard.
Once the question of whether to take an issue-oriented approach has
been decided, the next question confronting the Minnesota court is what
standard or standards of liability should be adopted. The standards
range from New York Times actual malice to negligence.
A standard of fault greater than negligence has been adopted only in
those states taking the issue-oriented approach, where special protection is given to statements involving public issues. 07 Three of the four
states that have taken the issue-oriented approach have adopted some
form of malice standard to be applied whenever an issue of public interest is involved in the defamation.0 ' Presumably these states are reserving the negligence standard for private-issue defamations.
Of these three states, Indiana and Colorado decided that New York
Times actual malice will be required whenever the defamation of a
private individual concerns an issue of public interest. 09 Both courts
203. 291 Minn. at 471, 193 N.W.2d at 142.
204. Id. at 475-77, 193 N.W.2d at 144-45.
205. Id. at 476, 193 N.W.2d at 145.
206. Id. at 471-72, 193 N.W.2d at 142.
207. Compare cases cited note 187, supra, with cases cited notes 218-19 infra.
208. See Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 26 Ariz. App. 274, 281, 547 P.2d 1074,
1081 (1976); Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 98-99, 538 P.2d 450, 457
(1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975); AAFCO Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v.
Northwest Pubs., Inc., - Ind. App.
321 N.E.2d 580, 586 (1974), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 913 (1976).
209. See Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 98-99, 538 P.2d 450, 457
(1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975); AAFCO Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v.
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decided that a vague negligence standard is inadequate to protect free
speech and that self-censorship would result from applying a negligence
standard. 10
The Arizona court, on the other hand, thought that convincing and
strong arguments can be made for either a negligence or a malice standard when private individuals are involved."' The court decided, however, to follow precedent set forth in Arizona decisions prior to Gertz
which applied a malice standard to cases involving newspaper publications. " ' Thus, Arizona requires a showing of either New York Times
actual malice or common law malice when a private individual involved
with a public issue has been defamed by the media."'
New York, the fourth state to take an issue-oriented approach, has
adopted a gross negligence standard rather than a malice standard. 21 ',
The New York court concluded that the Court in Gertz was reacting to
the Rosenbloom effect of protecting defendants too much and plaintiffs
too little.2 1 1 The court decided, therefore, that something less than a
malice standard should be applied."' New York conditions recovery
upon proof that "the publisher acted in a grossly irresponsible manner
without due consideration for the standards of information gathering
'2 1
and dissemination ordinarily followed by responsible parties.
Since Gertz, negligence standards have been applied in cases in
eleven states2t 5 and in one federal court.2 Although the majority opinion
Northwest Pubs., Inc., - Ind. App ....
321 N.E.2d 580, 586 (1974), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 913 (1976).
210. Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 99-100, 538 P.2d 450, 457-58
(1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975); AAFCO Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v.
Northwest Pubs., Inc., Ind. App ....
321 N.E.2d 580, 588-90 (1974), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976).
211. See Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 26 Ariz. App. 274, 280-81, 547 P.2d 1074,
1081 (1976).
212. Id. at 279-81, 547 P.2d at 1079-81.
213. Id. at 281, 547 P.2d at 1081.
214. See Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d 569,
379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975).
215. Id. at 198-99, 341 N.E.2d at 571, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 63-64.
216. Id. at 99, 341 N.E.2d at 571, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
217. Id.
218. See Firestone v. Time, Inc., 305 So. 2d 172, 178 (Fla. 1974) (per curiam), vacated,
96 Sup. Ct. 958 (1976); Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., Hawaii
, ,
543 P.2d 1356, 1362-67 (1975); Troman v. Wood, 62 Ill. 2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1975);
Gobin v. Globe Pub. Co., 216 Kan. 223, 230-34, 531 P.2d 76, 82-84 (1975); Wilson v.
Capital City Press, 315 So. 2d 393 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 320 So. 2d 203 (La. 1975);
Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 594-97, 350 A.2d 688, 696-98 (1976); Stone v.
Essex County Newspapers, Inc., Mass.
-, , 330 N.E.2d 161, 168 (1975);
Walters v. Sanford Herald, Inc., __
N.C. App. -,
228 S.E.2d 766 (1976); Martin v.
Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85, 90-92 (Okla. 1976); Thomas H. Maloney & Sons v.
E.W. Scripps Co., 43 Ohio App. 2d 105, 110, 334 N.E.2d 494, 498 (1974), cert. denied, 423
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in Gertz did not suggest a standard, it is clear that a negligence standard
was contemplated.220 Most of the twelve opinions, therefore, do not set
out their reasons for applying a negligence standard. Rather, the courts
have assumed that a negligence standard accomplishes the result required by Gertz.
Three of the eleven states clearly based their adoption of a negligence
standard on state constitutions. The Illinois court looked to a provision
of the Illinois constitution that recognizes an interest in reputation.2 ,
The Oklahoma 2 and Kansas 2 3 courts relied on language in state constitutions that makes individuals responsible for abusing the right to speak
and write freely.
Only the Hawaii court has dealt in depth with its reasons for adopting
a negligence standard. A major reason was that Hawaii case law since
1970 has required private individuals to show negligence. 24 The court
also rejected the reasons that other courts had used in adopting a malice
standard. The Hawaii court thus refused to give the free speech and
press clause of the Hawaii constitution a broader meaning than the first
amendment, refused to find that a negligence standard results in undue
self-censorship, and refused to give defendants more protection than
Gertz requires merely because a public issue may be involved.2 25
It is not clear whether the Minnesota court will adopt a standard of
malice, of recklessness, or of negligence. Although no state yet has responded to Gertz by adopting a malice or gross negligence standard in
lieu of its common law strict liability, such a response would simplify
Minnesota defamation law by eliminating a negligence standard. For
example, adoption of an actual malice standard would do away with the
necessity of distinguishing public from private plaintiffs and the attendant confusion over recoverable damages.22 1 Moreover, the Minnesota
U.S. 883 (1975); Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809, 817-20 (Tex. 1976),
cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3573 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977) (No. 76-926).
219. See Drotzmanns, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 500 F.2d 830, 832-33 (8th Cir. 1974)
(applying South Dakota law).
220. Justice Powell, writing for the majority in Gertz, mentioned negligence only in the
context of damages recoverable in the absence of actual malice. See Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974). The dissenting opinions assumed that a negligence
standard would be widely adopted. Chief Justice Burger dissented because he did not
know "the parameters of a 'negligence' doctrine as applied to the news media." Id. at 355.
Justice Brennan's dissent was based on his objection to the uncertainty and selfcensorship effects of a reasonable care standard. See id. at 366.
221. Troman v. Wood, 62 Ill. 2d 173, 194-95, 340 N.E.2d 292, 297 (1975).
222. Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85, 92 (Okla. 1976).
223. Gobin v. Globe Pub. Co., 216 Kan. 223, 232, 531 P.2d 76, 83 (1975).
224. See Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., - Hawaii -, 543 P.2d
1356, 1364 (1975).
225. Id. at -,

543 P.2d at 1364-66.

226. See notes 249-67 infra and accompanying text.
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court might adopt a malice or recklessness standard if it favors a broad
policy of protecting freedom of speech and press.
Arguments supporting the adoption of a negligence standard in Minnesota are no less persuasive. Negligence has been an active part of
Minnesota defamation law since 1889, when the court first interpreted
the retraction statute. That statute provides, among other things, that
a plaintiff's damages are limited to special damages if a newspaper
publisher can show that he acted in "good faith" and under a mistake
of fact in printing the libel. 27 The court held in Allen v. Pioneer-Press
Co. 221 that "good faith" means an absence of negligence. The court
viewed the retraction statute as imposing on the publisher a duty of
taking all reasonable precautions to prevent untrue and injurious publications about others. 229 Care is measured by the honest belief of a reasonable person under like circumstances.2 31 Factors to be considered in
determining negligence include the nature of the defamatory statement,
the reputation of the plaintiff, the extent to which the statement has
already been publicized, the extent of legitimate public interest in the
statement, and the extent to which "hot" news is involved. 23'
Apart from the retraction statute, the passage of the broadcaster's
statute in 1951 supports the argument that a negligence standard should
be adopted.2 23 The broadcaster's statute provides that the owner or operator of a broadcasting station is not liable for defamations spoken by
someone other than an agent or employee of the station, unless the
owner or operator failed to exercise due care in preventing publication
of the statement.2 3
Both the retraction and broadcaster's statutes apparently reflect a
legislative determination, furthered by judicial construction, that a negligence standard adequately protects freedom of speech and press. In
view of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Gertz that negligence affords sufficient first amendment protection to defendants, and
in view of existing Minnesota law, it appears that the most consistent
course open to the Minnesota court is adoption of a negligence standard
rather than a standard of malice or recklessness. A private individual,
227. MINN. STAT. § 548.06 (1976).
228. 40 Minn. 117, 125-26, 41 N.W. 936, 939 (1889); accord, Thorson v. Albert Lea Pub.
Co., 190 Minn. 200, 206-07, 251 N.W. 177, 180 (1933); Gray v:Times Newspaper Co., 74
Minn. 452, 457-58, 77 N.W. 204, 206 (1898).
229. See Allen v. Pioneer-Press Co., 40 Minn. 117, 125-26, 41 N.W. 936, 939 (1889).
230. Thorson v. Albert Lea Pub. Co., 190 Minn. 200, 206-07, 251 N.W. 177, 180 (1933);
Gray v. Times Newspaper Co., 74 Minn. 452, 457-58, 77 N.W. 204, 206 (1898); Allen v.
Pioneer-Press Co., 40 Minn. 117, 125-26, 41 N.W. 936, 939 (1889).
231. Allen v. Pioneer-Press Co., 40 Minn. 117, 126, 41 N.W. 936, 939 (1889).
232. Act of Apr. 20, 1951, ch. 532, 1951 Minn. Laws 800.
233. MINN. STAT. § 544.043 (1976).
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then, would be entitled to recover for defamation upon a showing of the
defendant's negligence.
ii. Application of the Gertz Requirement of Fault-Scope of the Fault
Requirement
The holding in Gertz allows the states to impose liability upon a
showing of "fault. ' 2 4 Clearly the Court was referring to the defendant's
fault in failing to ascertain the falsity of the statement.2 35 But a defendant can be at fault with regard to each of the elements of a defamation
action. That is, he can negligently refer to the plaintiff; he can negligently communicate the statement to a third party; he can negligently
fail to ascertain that his statement was false; and he can negligently fail
to realize the defamatory potential of the statement. 236 It is not clear
from Gertz whether the plaintiff must show fault with regard to each of
these four elements or only with regard to the element of falsity.
Under Minnesota law, the question of whether Gertz requires fault in
referring to the plaintiff is purely academic. The Minnesota common
law requirement of fault in referring to the plaintiff is stricter than the
constitutional minimum. Gertz would require only negligence in this
regard, whereas Minnesota law requires intention. 37 Similarly, Minnesota common law already imposes a fault requirement with regard to the
2
element of publication to a third party. 11
Whether Gertz requires fault in failing to realize the defamatory potential is a problematical question, although the Court supplied some
guidance for its resolution. The Court indicated that the holding of
Gertz applies to a defamation case "at least" where the substance of the
defamatory statement "makes substantial danger to reputation apparent. ' 239 The Court went on to say: "Our inquiry would involve considerations somewhat different from those discussed above if a State purported to condition civil liability on a factual misstatement whose content did not warn a reasonably prudent editor or broadcaster of its
2 40
defamatory potential.
This language indicates that a state may allow a private individual
to recover upon a showing of the defendant's negligent failure to ascertain the truth whenever a prudent editor would have realized the defam234. 418 U.S. at 347.
235. Id. at 325-32 (certiorari granted to reconsider issue of whether plaintiff had to prove
the defendant's knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth).
236. See notes 13-31, 53-54 supra and accompanying text.
237. Clare v. Farrell, 70 F. Supp. 276, 278-79 (D. Minn. 1947); Knox v. Meehan, 64
Minn. 280, 66 N.W. 1149 (1896); Dressel v. Shipman, 57 Minn. 23, 58 N.W. 684 (1894).
238. See Olson v. Molland, 181 Minn. 364, 232 N.W. 625 (1930); Kramer v. Perkins,
102 Minn. 455, 456-59, 113 N.W. 1062, 1063-64 (1907) (semble).
239. 418 U.S. at 348.

240. Id.
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atory potential of the statement. But for situations in which a prudent
editor would not have realized the defamatory potential of the statement, Gertz gives little guidance. The Court stated that Gertz did not
present this situation and that it would "intimate no view as to its
proper resolution.""' Until the Court resolves this question, the states
are left with two broad alternatives: either they may impose liability,
even though the defendant was not at fault in failing to realize the
defamatory potential of the statement; or they may refuse to impose
liability in this situation.
Under the first broad alternative, a court imposing liability must
decide what standard of liability-actual malice, negligence, or even
strict liability-will be applied to the element of falsity. Some support
for applying an actual malice standard to the element of falsity is found
in Gertz itself. In limiting its holding to statements which reasonably
warn of their defamatory potential, the Court cited Time, Inc. v. Hill.2
In Hill, a privacy action, the Court applied an actual malice standard
and indicated that a negligence standard is inadequate when the content of the statement does not warn of its potential for harm."' Applying
an actual malice standard to the element of falsity, then, gives effect to
2
the Hill dicta. 1
By contrast, a state applying a negligence standard or imposing strict
liability would ignore the Court's reference to Hill and rely instead on
the Court's language that it was intimating no view on the resolution of
this question. It seems doubtful, however, that the Court meant that a
state could revert to its common law of strict liability and impose liability when the defendant was not at fault in failing to ascertain the truth
of his statement. 5 In view of the Court's reference to Hill, it also seems
doubtful that the Court meant that a state could impose liability for
mere negligence in regard to the element of falsity. The imposition of
liability on either of these bases, therefore, finds little support in the
authorities, who treat the bases more as theoretical, than as practical,
solutions to the problem. 4 '
Under the second broad alternative, a state would refuse to impose
liability once it had been determined that the defendant did not know
241. Id.
242. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
243. Id. at 389.
244. Justice White, dissenting in Gertz, stated: "If I read the Court correctly, it clearly
implies that for those publications that do not make 'substantial danger to reputation
apparent,' the New York Times actual-malice standard will apply." 418 U.S. at 389 n.27.
At least one authority has agreed that this is the effect of the limitation. Frakt, The
Evolving Law of Defamation: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan to Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc. and Beyond, 6 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 471, 506 (1975).
245. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B, cimment c (1977).
246. Id.; Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEx. L. REV. 422, 463-64 (1975).
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and could not have known of the defamatory potential of the statement.
The practical effect of this alternative is to require negligence in regard
to both the element of falsity and the element of defamatory potential.
Hence, a plaintiff could not recover even if the defendant knew the
statement was false but did not know, and could not have known, of the
defamatory potential of the statement. Most authorities have taken the
position that this alternative provides the soundest solution to the prob2 47
lem.
The position which the Minnesota Supreme Court will take on this
problem is not clear. In the past the court has treated with little sympathy those statements which are not clearly defamatory.2 8 Most statements which would not warn a prudent editor are also statements which
are not clearly defamatory. It is possible, therefore, that the court's past
position on statements not clearly defamatory might be carried over
either to deny recovery or to impose an actual malice standard whenever
the defendant was not negligent in failing to realize the defamatory
potential of the statement.
b.

Damages

Gertz limits the damages recoverable to damages for actual injury,
unless actual malice is shown. 21 "Actual injury," the Court said, means
"actual harm inflicted by defamatory falsehood," including the "more
customary types . . . [such as] impairment of reputation and standing
in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering." 210 Although actual injury must be proven, this definition encompasses both the kind of harm for which the common law allows recovery
of special damages' and the kind of harm for which it allows recovery
of general damages.2 2 To prove actual injury, evidence assigning a dollar
247. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B, comment c (1977); Anderson, supra
note 246, at 463-64; Robertson, supra note 141, at 244.
248. For example, the requirement that extrinsic facts be pleaded when the statement
is not clearly defamatory has been vigorously followed. In Ten Broeck v. Journal Printing
Co., 166 Minn. 173, 207 N.W. 497 (1926), a newspaper story suggested that the plaintiff's
house may have been a house of prostitution and a hospital for abortions. But the court
held that it was not libel per se and was not actionable without pleading extrinsic facts
to establish the defamatory meaning.
Similarly, the court has sometimes been reluctant to find that a particular oral defamation constitutes slander per se. Thus, in Gaare v. Melbostad, 186 Minn. 96, 242 N.W. 466
(1932), the court held that it was not a disparagement of profession to say a banker is
"crooked." To the same effect is Schnobrich v. Venske, 146 Minn. 21, 177 N.W. 778 (1920),
in which the court held that accusations of poor bookkeeping by a school treasurer did
not impute harm to the treasurer's profession as banker.
249. 418 U.S. at 348-50.
250. Id. at 350.
251. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
252. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
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value to the injury is unnecessary, but there must be evidence to support
the award.253
If the Minnesota court responds to Gertz by selecting an actual malice
standard for private individual cases, the Gertz damage limitations will
have no effect, If the court selects a negligence standard, however, damages cannot be presumed in slander per se and libel cases ' unless the
private plaintiff shows actual malice. If the Minnesota retraction statute applies, presumed damages are not recoverable against a newspaper,
even upon a showing of actual malice, unless a retraction has been
25 5
demanded.
In cases where special pecuniary damage is a common law requirement of actionability,2 5 this requirement must still be met." 7 But even
if this requirement is met, additional damages which would then be
presumed under the common law cannot be recovered unless the private
individual also proves actual malice.258
If the private individual cannot prove actual malice to obtain presumed damages, he may nevertheless recover damages for the types of
harm which are encompassed by presumed damages, to the extent that
he can actually prove such harm. 59
To avoid the self-censorship that follows from large damage awards,
Gertz also limits punitive damages to cases where actual malice can be
proven.6 0 Under the Minnesota common law of defamation, punitive
damages can be recovered if common law malice is shown by evidence
"
of the defendant's bad faith, ill will, or spite.26
' Because Gertz requires
253. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
254. See notes 38-49 supra and accompanying text.
255. See MINN. STAT. § 548.06 (1976).
256. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
257. Sauerhoff v. Hearst Corp., 388 F. Supp. 117, 118-24 (D. Md. 1974), vacated and
remanded, 538 F.2d 588 (4th Cir. 1976) (district court erred in finding a defamation per
quod rather than a defamation per se); see Comment, supra note 160, at 278 (Gertz did
not address the common law rule which requires special pecuniary damage as a threshold
of actionability). But see Frakt, supra note 244, at 504-05 (in view of the Gertz requirements, complex jury instructions would be avoided if special damages were no longer a
threshold of actionability for slanders).
258. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348-50 (1974). See generally Anderson,
supra note 246, at 473-75.
259. Lawlor v. Gallagher Presidents' Report, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 721, 733-35 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), remanded mem., 538 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1976); see Sauerhoff v. Hearst Corp., 538
F.2d 588, 591-92 (4th Cir. 1976). See also Robertson, supra note 141, at 230-34 (discussion
of cases which have addressed the issue of proving actual injury).
260. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348-50 (1974).
261. Hammersten v. Reiling, 262 Minn. 200, 209, 115 N.W.2d 259, 265-66 (court using
term "actual malice" to describe common law malice, not New York Times malice), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962); McCuskey v. Kuhlmann, 147 Minn. 460, 461, 179 N.W. 1000,
1000 (1920) (same); MacInnis v. National Herald Printing Co., 140 Minn. 171, 175, 167
N.W. 550, 551 (1918) (same).
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a showing of actual malice, common law malice is no longer sufficient
if it consists of something other than knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard of the truth.
Some states have never allowed punitive damages in a defamation
action,"'2 or have allowed them only on a very limited basis. 6 ' At least
one federal court has recently discarded punitive damages, reasoning
that their effect is to suppress unpopular speech.2 6 ' It seems doubtful
that the Minnesota court will take that course. Historically, punitive
damage awards for defamation have not been large in the Minnesota
courts.115 The size of an award seldom has occasioned reversal, and
remittitur has had to be used sparingly. " Furthermore, the Minnesota
Supreme Court has recently reiterated the proposition that punitive
damages are proper in a defamation action. 67
3.

Impact of New York Times, Butts, and Gertz on Common Law
Defenses

It is clear from the holdings of New York Times, Butts, and Gertz that
a plaintiff must now prove either actual malice or some fault on the part
of the defendant. But the impact of these holdings on a defendant's case
is less explicit. In particular, the three cases raise questions concerning
262. See Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., - Mass.
, -,
330 N.E,2d
161, 169 (1975); Farrar v. Tribune Pub. Co., 57 Wash. 2d 549, 552-53, 358 P.2d 792,794-95
(1961) (en banc).
263. See Barton v. Barnett, 226 F. Supp. 375, 379 (N.D. Miss. 1964) (punitive damages
not recoverable for libel per quod unless actual damages are proved); Proto v. Bridgeport
Herald Corp., 136 Conn. 557, 571, 72 A.2d 820, 828 (1950) (punitive damages limited to
plaintiff's costs of litigation less taxable costs); Wabash Printing & Pub. Co. v. Crumrine,
123 Ind. 89, 93, 21 N.E. 904, 905 (1889) (punitive damages not recoverable if defendant is
subject to criminal prosecution for libel).
264. See Maheu v. Hughes Tool Co., 384 F. Supp. 166 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (California
statute which provides for recovery of punitive damages is unconstitutional), noted in 28
VAND. L. REv. 887 (1975).
265. See Hammersten v. Reiling, 262 Minn. 200, 209, 115 N.W.2d 259, 265-66 ($7500;
the largest award of punitive damages appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962); Loftsgaarden v. Reiling, 267 Minn. 181, 126 N.W.2d 154
($5000; the second largest award of punitive damages appealed to the Minnesota Supreme
Court), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 845 (1964).
266. See Roemer v. Jacob Schmidt Brewing Co., 132 Minn. 399, 404, 157 N.W. 640, 642
(1916) (excessiveness of punitive damages unclear from court's holding); Peterson v. Western Union Tel. Co., 75 Minn. 368, 77 N.W. 985 (1899) (remittitur; $2000 reduced to $1000);
Fredrickson v. Johnson, 60 Minn. 337, 341-44, 62 N.W. 388, 389-90 (1895) (remittitur;
$5000 reduced to $3000). See also Gray v. Times Newspaper Co., 78 Minn. 323, 81 N.W.
7 (1899) (trial court did not abuse discretion by setting aside excessive verdict in defamation action).
267. See Wild v. Rarig, 302 Minn. 419, 447, 234 N.W.2d 775, 793 (1975) (per curiam)
(dictum), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 945 (1976). See also Loftsgaarden v. Reiling, 267 Minn.
181, 126 N.W.2d 154 (punitive damages, because of their deterrent and punishment value,
can be recovered even in the absence of actual damages), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 845 (1964).
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the affirmative defense of truth and the viability of common law defenses.
Truth is an affirmative defense under the common law."' This defense
may now be outmoded. If the plaintiff is a public official or public
figure, he must prove the defendant had knowledge of the statement's
falsity or had actual, subjective doubts about its truth. The Minnesota
court has said that this requirement also imposes a duty upon the public
official or public figure to prove the statement was false." 9 The defendant's burden of proving truth has thus been transformed into the public plaintiff's burden of proving falsity.
The effect of Gertz on the affirmative defense of truth presents a more
difficult question. The Restatement suggests that the defense of truth
is outmoded after Gertz because the private individual's burden of
showing negligent failure to ascertain the truth necessitates, as a practical matter, a showing of the statement's falsity. 70 Whether the Minnesota court will follow the Restatement's suggestion is an open question.
No clear trend has developed in other states." Although the Restatement's suggestion has merit, there may be good reasons for not heeding
it. The Restatement analysis may not hold true in every case, because
a plaintiff may be able to prove the defendant's negligence merely by
2
showing a failure to investigate or reliance upon questionable sources.
This would not necessarily entail proof of falsity. Furthermore, the
common law rule that truth is an affirmative defense protects the plaintiff's privacy. The court might reason that a defamed plaintiff, who
already feels injury to his reputation, should not be compelled to reveal
private facts in order to vindicate his reputation.23
268. E.g., Hrdlicka v. Warner, 144 Minn. 277, 278-79, 175 N.W. 299, 299-300 (1919);
Wilcox v. Moore, 69 Minn. 49, 52, 71 N.W. 917, 918-19 (1897).
269. Beatty v. Ellings, 285 Minn. 293, 301-02, 173 N.W.2d 12, 17-18 (1969), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 904 (1970). This rule apparently carries over from the common law rule that the
burden of proving truth was on the plaintiff once a common law privilege was raised as a
defense. See, e.g., Clancy v. Daily News Corp., 202 Minn. 1, 10, 277 N.W. 264, 269 (1938);
Peterson v. Steenerson, 113 Minn. 87, 90, 129 N.W. 147, 148 (1910).
270. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B, comment i (1977).
271. Compare, e.g., Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 597, 350 A.2d 688, 698
(1976) (adopting the Restatement rule) with, e.g., Lowenschuss v. West Pub. Co., 542 F.2d
180, 184 (3d Cir. 1976) (by implication) (truth remains an affirmative defense).
272. In Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 156-58 (1967), the Court specifically
pointed to inadequate investigation and reliance upon questionable sources as evidence
which was sufficient to show the publisher's recklessness.
273. This conclusion is supported by the Court's recent decision of Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 96 S. Ct. 958 (1976), in which defendant Time magazine argued that it had an
absolute privilege to publish a report of judicial proceedings involving private aspects of
plaintiff's divorce litigation. The Court rejected the argument, stating:
while participants in some litigation may be legitimate "public figures," either
generally or for the limited purpose of that litigation, the majority will more
likely resemble respondent, drawn into a public forum largely against their will
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The common law privileges continue to provide a defense in a defamation action. Unlike the constitutional protections, which can be defeated
by actual malice or fault, absolute privileges cannot be defeated.," The
qualified privileges will not, however, afford any additional protection
if the plaintiff is a public official or public figure. Because the public
plaintiff must prove actual malice as a constitutional requirement to
recovery, this proof encompasses common law malice and defeats the
qualified privilege.2"
On the other hand, if the plaintiff is a private individual, the qualified
privilege will afford more protection than the Constitution in those
states which have responded to Gertz by adopting a negligence standard
of fault. In Minnesota, mere negligence is not common law malice and
therefore will not defeat the qualified privilege.26 Because Gertz leaves
the qualified privileges untouched,2 7 if a defendant has a qualified privilege in a private individual action, he should raise it as a defense.
V.

CONCLUSION

Decisions of the United States Supreme Court since 1964 have had a
significant effect on defamation law. First amendment requirements
have modified the common law by replacing the strict liability of a
defamation action with fault standards linked to the public or private
status of the plaintiff.
In many states, the requirements have meant substantial changes in
defamation law. In Minnesota, the impact of the decision in New York
Times was not significant because Minnesota had adopted, decades
before, a rule giving special protection to criticism of public officials.
in order to attempt to obtain the only redress available to them or to defend
themselves against actions brought by the State or by others. There appears
little reason why these individuals should substantially forfeit that degree of
protection which the law of defamation would otherwise afford them simply by
virtue of their being drawn into a courtroom.
Id. at 966-67.
274. See notes 56-57 supra and accompanying text.
275. See notes 58-61 supra and accompanying text.
276. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
277. See, e.g., Tendler v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 43 Cal. App. 3d 788, 118 Cal. Rptr.
274 (1974); Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 597-601, 350 A.2d 688, 698-700 (1976);
Barbetta Agency, Inc. v. Evening News Pub. Co., 135 N.J. Super. 214, 343 A.2d 105 (App.
Div. 1975); Hahn v. Kotten, 43 Ohio St. 2d 237, 331 N.E.2d 713 (1975) (by implication);
Calero v. Del Chemical Corp., 68 Wis. 2d 487, 498-504, 228 N.W.2d 737, 743-47 (1975).
As recently as 1975, the Minnesota court differentiated constitutional protections from
common law privileges. In McBride v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., - Minn. -,
-,
235
N.W.2d 371, 374-75 & n.1 (1975), the court reiterated the rules governing the common law
privileges and distinguished express or actual malice in the context of common law privileges from actual malice in the context of constitutional protections afforded by New York
Times and Butts.
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Similarly, if the Minnesota Supreme Court responds to Gertz by adopting a negligence standard, novel concepts will not be introduced into
Minnesota defamation law because of case law applying a negligence
standard under the retraction statute.
Gertz cuts back on the constitutional protection afforded to publicissue statements and leaves to the states the task of deciding the role of
public-issue statements in their defamation law. This is, perhaps, the
most significant decision the Minnesota Supreme Court will have to
make when it selects a standard of fault because every state that affords
special protection to public-issue statements necessarily selects a standard of fault involving greater culpability than negligence. The Minnesota court may decide that public-issue statements will not be protected
adequately by a negligence standard even though the cases construing
the Minnesota retraction statute indicate that the public nature of the
statement is a factor in determining negligence. Alternatively, the court
may decide that New York Times and Butts adequately protect the
discussion of public issues because "public official" and "public figure"
are defined largely in terms of the individual's involvement in issues of
public controversy or importance. Once this decision is made by the
Minnesota court, the application of New York Times, Butts, and Gertz
can be ascertained more precisely.
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